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JUSTICE BRENNAN VS. THE CONSTITUTIONt
RAOUL BERGER *
Not content to rest on his ex cathedra statements from the marble halls of the Supreme
Court, justice Brennan latterly has descended into the forensic arena to expatiate on his
remarkable interpretations of the Constitution) His fresh theories recall Anatole France's
delicious satire on the Dreyfus case. Captain Dreyfus had been cashiered and sent to
Devil's Island - on the basis of testimony fabricated by the Army. The case would not stay
buried and, as France tells it, the Minister of War called on the General in charge and
noticed that all the walls were covered with shelves laden with files extending up to the
ceiling, while porters were bringing in fresh bales of packets, which the General, with
the "radiant look of a hero," said were fresh "proofs." "Very good," said the Minister,
"very good! but I am afraid that this [Dreyfus] business may lose its beautiful simplicity
.... Proof's! of course it is good to have proofs, but perhaps it is better to have none at
all." Initially, he continued, the case was "invulnerable because it was invisible. Now it
gives an enormous handle for discussion. That may equally be said of Brennan's
explanations.
One who doffs the judicial robe and enters the debate about the Court's ongoing
revision of the Constitution must expect to be viewed as just another debater, particularly
when he speaks harshly of the opposition. Those who differ with hint "feign self-effacing
deference to specific judgments of those who forged the original social compact," that
is "arrogance clothed as humility." It is arrogant "to pretend that ... we can gauge
accurately the intent of the framers."
Consider Brennan's opinion that it is impossible "accurately to gauge the intent of
the framers," and his assertion that critics of that view "have no familiarity with the
historical record."' Let us look at the record with respect to federal intervention in
matters of suffrage under the cloak of the fourteenth amendment. Section two reduces
t Copyright © Boston College Law School
Raoul Berger is a retired Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History at Harvard
Law School.
' See Address by Justice Brennan, Georgetown University, Washington. D.C., (October 1, 1985),
in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION I (Federalist Soc'y 1986);
[hereinafter Tire GREAT Dk;BATE]; Brennan, Reason, Passion, and 4w Progress of the Law, 42 Rc.c, B.A.
Crry or N.Y. 948 (September 17, 1987).
2 A. FRANCE, PENGUIN ISLAND I4 )3-94 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1909).
3 THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 1, at 14.
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state representation in the House of Representatives in proportion as blacks are denied
the franchise. Discriminate if you will, but at a price. Senator Jacob Howard, who, with
Elisha Washburne, "had been the only Republicans to hold out for black suffrage to the
end, all the others proved willing to abandon it," 5 said that "[t]he second section leaves
the right to regulate the elective franchise with the States, and does not meddle with
that right."" Howard is confirmed by the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion, which drafted the amendment: "[i]t was doubtful ... whether the States would
consent. to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were at-
tached." Consequently, the Committee commended section two because it "would leave
the whole question with the people of each State, holding out to all the advantage of
increased political power as an inducement to allow all to participate in its exercise. "7
Such reports in the legislative history of statutes carry great weight."
Where Justice Brennan could not discern the framers' intent, Justice Harlan de-
clared that the one man-one vote doctrine flew "in the face of irrefutable and still
unanswered history. "9 Brennan explains that "Mt:cognition of the principle of 'one man,
one vote' as a constitutional one redeems the promise of self-governance by affirming
the essential dignity of every citizen in the right to equal participation in the democratic
process,"'" nullifying the judgment expressed iii the fifteenth, sixteenth and twenty-sixth
amendments that jurisdiction over suffrage required action by the people, never mind
the demands of "human dignity," of which more anon.
Nor is the doctrine of "original intent" the bastard doctrine Justice Brennan depicts;
its roots go back over six hundred years.y John Selden, a seventeenth century sage,
stated: "A Man's Wryting has but one true sense,.which is that which the author meant
when he writ it,"i 2 particularly when the author contemporaneously explained what he
meant. This is the essence of communication; a speaker or writer must be allowed to
explain what he meant by his utterance; the listener or reader may not put his own
meaning in the mouth of the speaker or writer. Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Marshall
NI. L. BE:Epic:1', A COMPRONIISE OF PRINCIPLE 170 (1974); See J.R. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 82 (1956).
"ALFRED AV1NS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 220, 237 (1967).
7 Id. at 94.
"See Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440. 463 (1036); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy,
315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942); Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 E.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir.
1951).
"Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Activist Louis
1,usky wrote that Harlan's demonstration is "irrefutable and unrefuted." Lusky, Government by the
Judicialy: What Price Legitimacy?, 6 HAsTiNcs Coxsr. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979).
'" 'Fin; GREAT DEBATE„MPra note I, at 22.
" See R. Berger, Original Intention in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 101 (1986).
For a sumtary, see R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 193—'201 (1987). The English
historian, S. R. Chrimes, concluded that, "the rule of reference to the intention of the legislators
. was certainly established by the second half of the fifteenth century." S.R. CHRIMES, ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 293 (1936). In Magdalen College Cases, Chief
Justice Coke stated, "in Acts of Parliament which are to be construed according to the intent and
meaning of the makers of them, the original intent and meaning is to be observed." 77 Eng. Rep.
1235, 1245 (1615).
' 2 JOHN SELDEN, TABI.E TA1.K: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, Esq. 10 (1696). On the
heels of the Convention, Justice James Wilson, a leading Framer, wrote, "lt]he first and governing
maxim in the interpretation of a statute is to discover the meaning of those who made it." 1 WORKS
OF JAMES WILSON 75 (McCloskey ed. 1967).
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declared that he could cite from the common law "the most complete evidence that the
intention is the most sacred rule of interpretation."'" An activist commentator who sought
to read original intent out of the common law conceded that, from the Jefferson Ad-
ministration onward, original intent has been the reigning doctrine of American law."
Another activist, Thomas Grey, acknowledges that "interpretivism," or intentionalism, is
a view "of great power and compelling simplicity ... deeply rooted in our history and
our shared principles of political legitimacy. It has equally deep roots in our formal
constitutional law."'" Such views should not be derided as "arrogance clothed in humility."
DUE PROCESS OE LAW
Justice Brennan postulates "the patent ambiguity of the terms 'due process of law,'"
an•assumption history contradicts. He notes its derivation from Magna Carta, the "equiv-
alent" of "law of the land."''' Elsewhere I have traced the "procedural" course of "law
of' the land" and its identification with clue process, the process that is due.' 7 Here it
must suffice that on the eve of the Federal Convention Hamilton stated: "Wile words
'due process' have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and
proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of the leOlature." 1 "
Charles Curtis, an admirer of the Court's innovations, nevertheless considered that the
meaning of due process of law in the fifth amendment "was as fixed and definite as the
common law could make a phrase .... It meant a procedural due process."'° Of due
process we may say with Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of "treason:" "It is scarcely
conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our constitution in the
sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it." 2° Certainly that
was how Hamilton understood the concept.
But for what John Hari Ely justly labels a couple of "aberrational" cases, 2 ' that was
the accepted meaning which the fourteenth amendment. did not change. John Bingham,
draftsman of the fourteenth amendment, said that its meaning had long ago been settled
by the courts. 22
 The Supreme Court stated in linriado v. California that the phrase was
used in the fourteenth "in the same sense and with no greater extent" than in the fifth."
" JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE or MCCUI.LOCH V. MARYLAND 167 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
' 1 Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 linitv. L. REV. 885, 926-27, 934, 946
(1985). The Court, said Jacobus tenBrock, "has insisted, with almost iminterruNed regularity, that
the end of constitutional construction is the discovery of the intention of those persons who
formulated the instrument. - ten Broek, Use by the United Slates Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, '27 CALIF. L. REv. 399 (1939).
15 Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 SEAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1975).
1 " Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, supra note 1, at 967; Address by Justice II cu
entitled The Fourteenth Amendment. N.Y.U. School of Law, (August 8, 1986), at 13-14 (mimeographed
copy) [hereinafter' The Fourteenth Amendment].
ti See Berger, "Lain of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1979).
'" 4 PAPERS Or ALEXANDER 14,1,mn:roN 35 (Syron & Cooke eds. 1962) (emphasis added).
lir Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 170, 177 (E. Calm ed.
1954). Charles Haines wrote that in England due process of law referred to "a method of procedure
in criminal trials,'' and America accepted it"with the usual English significance," not "as a check
on legislative authority." C. 1.1mriEs, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE Or JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 410 (1932).
a United States v. Burr, 25 E Cas. 55, 165 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
21 1 ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY or JUDICIAL Review 16, 18 (1980).
22 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
Hurrado v. People of California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
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Brennan asserts, however, relying on Hurtado, decided in 1884, that the Court "from
the beginning rejected the notion that 'due process of law' as used either in the fifth or
the fourteenth amendments, embraced nothing except what was the law of the land,' as
sanctioned by settled usage." 24 As regards the fifth amendment, 1884 manifestly was not
"from the beginning." The issue in Hurtado was whether California could prosecute a
criminal offense by information a prosecutor filed, rather than by grand jury indictment.
Noting that the fifth amendment expressly provided both for due process and indictment
by grand jury, whereas the latter was absent from the fourteenth, the Court declined to
read a grand jury requirement into the due process of the fourteenth. The gratuitous
dictum that judicial procedure was not frozen in ancient patterns was hardly an invitation
to employ due piocess in order to censor substantive legislation. That was a generic
alteration of a later day, when the Court, to quote Justice Brennan, was "shield[ingl the
excesses" of "expanding capital from governmental restraints." 25 Since then, the Court
has repudiated that practice, referring to "our abandonment of the use of the 'vague
contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believed
to be economically unwise .... We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom
of legislation.'"6
This abnegation, hoWever, did not extend to "social" legislation, a differentiation
without textual basis." Judge Learned Hand considered that "Nhere is no constitutional
basis for asserting a larger measure of judicial supervision over liberty than over prop-
erty."23 As Justice Brennan notes, the fourteenth amendment lay "substantially dormant
as a document of human freedom until at least the 1930s." 29 So we are constrained to
assume that the recent Court has drunk more deeply of the Pierian Spring than did its
predecessors, notwithstanding that "constructions by contemporaries" of the Constitution
carry great weight because, Justice William Johnson explained, they "had the best op-
portunities of informing themselves of the framers of the constitution and of the sense
put upon it by the people when it was adopted by them.""
In truth "liberty" is a frail support for a "document of human freedom." That word,
James Wilson explained to the framers of the fourteenth amendment, reading Black-
stone's definition, meant freedom of locomotion, the right to come and go where one
pleases. 3 ' This definition had special relevance for the framers because the Black Codes
riveted blacks to their habitat on pain of being sold into virtual slavery under the vagrancy
laws. 32 During the Ratification campaign, "liberty" was again explained in terms of
22 The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 16, at 14.
29 1d. at 3.
26 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
22 Brennan observes, "lilt was in particular the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no
person be deprived of life, liberty, or property ... that led us to apply many of the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the States." THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 1, at 20-21. The
clause does not differentiate between liberty and property. History discloses that "property" was
actually more highly prized by the Founders than "liberty." See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDI-
CIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THF: FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 266-68 (1977).
28
 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50, 51 (1962).
2" The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 16, at 19.
" Ogden v, Saunders, 25 U.S. 132 (12 Wheat.) 213, 270, 290 (1827).
See AviNs, supra note 6, at 164.
82 Senator Henry Wilson urged the Framers to insure that the freedman "can go where he
pleases." AVINS, supra note 6, at 98.
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freedom to come and go." So far as Brennan regards it as "a solemn duty to interpret,
and apply the new constitutional restraints in the spirit and sense intended by their
framers,'' lle is wide of the mark. Chief justice Taney emphasized, "[I]f in this cottrt
we are at liberty 10 give old words new meanings ... there is no power which may not,
by this mode of construction, be conferred on the general government and denied to
the States"''' in contravention of the tenth amendment. Earlier Madison wrote, if "the
sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation ... be not the
guide in expounding it there can be no security for a consistent and stable [government],
more than 14 a faithful exercise of its powers. ":"'
Against this Brennan asserts that:
the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the (ex( mean in our
time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not On any static meaning it
might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of
its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs."
This is empty rhetoric. The "principles" were articulated in "words"; change the meaning
of the "words" and you change the "principles."" Brennan is welcome to give words
that he employs a new meaning, but he may not saddle the framers with his meaning.
He departs front the views expressed by Marshall,'" Taney, Madison, and the Court
itself:I" And in more decorous diction, he is affirming that the Founders "may not rule
us from their graves," thus repudiating the Constitution, text and ail, whilst he purports
to speak in its name.
Brennan's escape from the procedural content — "the sweeping generalities of its
language"'" — of due process stirs large doubts. In England, he notes, due process was
a check only on the Crown, not on Parliament. 12 The framers rejected parliamentary
supremacy and vested "sovereignty in the people at large."" From this rejection Brennan
33 Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania,
18 AKRON I... REV. 435, 448 (1985).
31 The Fourteenth Amendment„cupra now 16, at 13 (emphasis added).
3' Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 478 (1849).
3 ' ; THE WRITINGS (IF JAMES MADISON 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
37 THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 1,
"The "words" in a written Constitution designed to hunt power, were meant to "bind" down
our delegates "from mischief by the chains of I he Constitution," said Jefferson. 4 J. ELLicrr, DF.HATI ,,s
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (2d ed.
1836).
sp If a word was understood in a certain sense when the Constitution was framed," said Chief
justice Nlarshall, then the "convention must have used the word in that sense." and it is that sense
which is to be given judicial effect. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. 190 (1824).
4" In South Carolina v. United States, I lse Court declared, "Itlhe Constitution is a written instru-
ment. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means now.
Any other rule of construction would ithnigitie the judicial character of this court, and ntake it the
mere reflex of die popular opinion or passion of the day.'" 199 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1905); see also
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL L/MITA'FIONS 54 (1st ed.
1868).
4' After noting the "fixed" procedural character or due process, Charles Curtis, who rejoiced
in judicial "adaptation" of the Constitution, asked. "lbha who made it a large generality? Not they
[die Framers]. We [the Court] did," Curtis, supra note 19, at 177.
42 Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, supra note 1, al 964.
43 Id. at 965.
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wrings the non-sequitur that "merely following the rule is not enough to satisfy the
demands of due process.'" Lodging sovereignty in the people merely transferred the
power of making rules, and sheds no light on whether "merely following the rule" is
enough. Brennan recognizes that the framers considered officials as "agents of the
people, to whom certain limited authority had been delegated;" that the Constitution
was "a great power of attorney, under which no power can he exercised but what is
expressly given;" and that it "served to restrain their [agents] conduct." 45 These "re-
straints" are set at naught by his theory that he can change the meaning of the words
the framers used to articulate them. Inasmuch as due process had a centuries-old
procedural content, that "definition," according to Justice Story, as good as stood in the
text.46 Justice Story merely restated the long-standing canon that common law terms in
an enactment are to he given their common law meaning. 47 Where is Justice Brennan
authorized to revise those terms?
His warrant 14 casting this history into the discard is James Wilson's statement that
"'they who execute, and they who administer the laws, are so much the servants, and
therefore as much the friends of the people, as those who make them. — Under such a
theory of goveromment, due process could no longer mean mere official conformity to
duly enacted legal rules — governance by reason alone. Instead, due process requires
fidelity to a more basic and more subtle principle: the essential dignity and worth of
each individual.]" The context of Wilson's remarks repels so far-fetched an implication.
Gordon Wood, whom Brennan cites, paraphrases Wilson:
Although the authority of their governors and judges became in 1776 as
much the "child of the people" as that of the legislators, the people could
not forget their traditional colonial aversion to the executive and judiciary,
and their fondness for their legislatures, which under the British monarchy
had been the guardians of their rights and the anchor of their political
hopes. -1 "
Wilson, then a Justice, commented in his 1791 Lectures, that:
it is high time ... that we should chastise our prejudices .... The executive
and judicial powers are now drawn from the same source, are now animated
by the same principles, and are now directed to the same ends, with the
legislative authority: they who execute, and they who administer the laws,
are so much the servants, and therefore as much the friends of the people,
as those who make them. 5°
44 Id. at 973.
45 1d. at 965.
Justice Story stated that when the draftsmen employed common law terms, the common law
"definitions arc necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text." United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820); see also supra note 39.
' 7
 For citations, see Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by the Court 63 CORNELL L.
REv. 355, 360-62 (1978).
48
 Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, .supra note 1, at 966.
4 '4 G. Woon, "DIE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1777-1787 598 (1969).
so Id.
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To extract from Wilson's plea to bury the "prejudice" against the judiciary a shift from
the procedural meaning of due process to "fidelity to the underlying vision of human
dignity enshrined in the Due Process Clause"" is a triuinph of legerdemain.
"PURE REASON " AND " PASSION "
Another example of Brennan's "instant history" is furnished by his account of how
federal judges came to resort to "pure reason." He proceeds from the "stxuggle between
the Republican President. [Jefferson] and Congress and the Federalist bench," that came
to a head in the impeachment and acquittal of Justice Samuel Chase in 1805. 52 From
this he deduces that "The Judicial branch was thus born not on the lofty peaks of pure
reason, but in the trenches of partisan politics."55 The judicial branch, however, was
"horn" in 1787 when the ['miners created a federal judiciary. The "origins of the formalist
conception," presumably meaning reliance on "pure reason," Brennan attributes to the
"spectre of politicization that hung over the Court in its early years," that is, the judiciary's
understanding of the need "to tether its decisions to constitutional principles and not
party affiliation." 54 By way of confirmation, he cites to. the preface to 1 Cranch of the
Supreme Court's Reports, wherein the reporter, William Cranch, Chief Justice of the
District of' Columbia Circuit, stated that "the least possible range ought to be left to the
discretion of' the Judge .... Every :case decided is a check upon the Judge. He cannot
decide a similar case differently without strong reasons, which, he will wish to make
public."55 "Thus," Brennan concludes, "were institutionalized two important. checks on
judicial discretion — the recording of precedent, and the requirement of a public and
reasoned explanation of the judicial result." 55
A reporter of the Court's opinions, however, could hardly "institutionalize	 . checks
upon judicial discretion." MoreoVer, reasoned opinions were a familiar staple of English
courts; Marshall's 'opinion	 Álarbu.ry v. Madison." is a classic example, and this before
•
the Chase impeitchment. Nor did Cranch derive his checks from the blue; they were of
long standing. The colonists, Cordon Wood found, had "a profound fear of judicial
,independence and discretion." 58 And adherence to precedent was deeply rooted in
51 Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, supra note 1, at 974. Edward J.
on Brennan's exaltation of "human dignity" that it "flies in the face of the literal
Constitution itself," i.e., the eighth amendment's contemplation of the deprivation
process, and "contradicts the clear and unequivocal language of' the Constitution."
tutional Scholarship: What Next? 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 17, 52, 57 (1988).
" Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, supra note 1, at 955.
5' Id. at 956 (emphasis added).
51 Id.
55 Id. at 956-57.
56 Id. at 957.
57 5 U.S. (1 Crunch),137 (1803),
58 WOOD, supra note 49, at 298. Morton Horwitz found that "judicial innovation itself was
regarded as an impermissible exercise of will." Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception
of American Law, 1780-1820 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287, 303 (1971). Even the Tory
Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts declared in 1767 that "the Judge should never be the
Legislator; Because, then the Will of the Judge would be the Law: and this tends to a State of
Slavery." Id. at 292.
Erler comments
language of the
of life, with due
E. Erler, Consti-
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English law and was echoed by Hamilton in Federalise No. 78.59 Hamilton stated, "To
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
clown by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty." 69
The Chase impeachment did not charge "politicization" of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions, but his use of charges to the jury as a pulpit for rabid assaults on the Jeffersonians,
a frequent practice of Federalist judges e 1
To "avoid undue politicization of the judiciary," Brennan recounts, "it was essential
that their decisions be the product of reason rather than party politics," leading to
neglect of a counterpoise to "pure reason." That leavening element he denominated
"passion," meaning "the range of emotional and intuitive responses to a given set of
facts or arguments, responses which often speed into our consciousness far ahead of the
lumbering syllogisms of reason.""2 More crudely, justice Douglas acknowledged the great
role of a justice's "gut reactions."" Given that suffrage was excluded from the fourteenth
amendment and left to the States, as the text reveals, Brennan's "intuitive and emotional
responses" can hardly justify his reversal of the framers' determination by the one man-
one vote decision. True it is that often 'Judges must choose between basic principles;""
but it does not follow that they are free to reverse such a constitutional provision.
Nor is Brennan's reliance on Cardozo well taken. In The Nature of the Judicial Process,
Brennan tells us, Cardozo "adhered to pure reason as the goal to which judges .. .
should continue to aspire." Some years later, however, Cardozo would come to cham-
pion the role of "intuition," quoting, "[t]he law has its piercing intuitions, . its tense
apocalyptic moments .... Imagination, whether you call it scientific or artistic, is for
[both law and science] die faculty that creates.""" Cardozo was discussing the process of
reasoning, "when one is hard beset,""7 and perplexities are resolved by a flashing insight.
This was intuition as an aid to pure reason, not its antithesis. No scientist would wait for
"passion" in the sense of the "heart rather than the head"''" to solve a problem in
mathematics or physics. Cardozo's most vaulting imagination would not have led him to
reverse the framers' manifest determination.
"Intuition" led to the highly controversial Supreme Court decisions invalidating
economic and social legislation, of which Lochner v, New York was the most famous
example. 6° There the Court struck down a New York statute that limited the number of
hours per week that bakery employees could work as a deprivation of liberty, holding
that. the law interfered with the liberty of bakery owners and workers to contract freely
THE FEnERALisT No, 78, at 510 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). Without the common
law, i.e., precedent, wrote Chancellor Kent, "the court would be left with a dangerous discretion to
roam at large in the trackless field of their own imagination." I J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 373 (6th ed. 1858).
'"' THE FEDERALIST, supra note 59. at 510.
61 R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 225-26 (1973).
"2
 Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, supra note I, at 958.
Douglas admitted "that the 'gut' reaction of a judge at the level of' constitutional adjudication
dealing with the vagaries Pl of due process ... was the main ingredient of his decision." W.O.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975 8 (1981).
"4
 Reason, Passion, and tine Progress of the Law, supra note. 1, at 953.
"5 Id. at 958.
"" Id. at 959.
67 B. CARDozo, PARADOXES OF LEGAL. SCIENCE 59 (1928) thereinafter CARDOZO, PARADOXESI.
"" Reason, Passion, and Ike Progress of the Law, supra note I , at 958.
f" Id. at 959; see Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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with each other. Liberty had been defined by Blackstone as freedom of locomotion, to
go where one pleased without restraint." It seems clear, for instance, that liberty did
not comprehend freedom of speech, considered by Cardozo "the matrix, the indispens-
able condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."' Yet, as Charles Warren pointed
out, the "free speech" of the first amendment could not have been comprehended in
the due process of the fifth because, "having already provided in the First Amendment
an absolute prohibition on Congress to take away certain rights" it is "hardly conceivable
that the framers ... would, in the Fifth ... provide that Congress might take away the
same rights by due process of law."" No pre-1787 extension of "liberty" to freedom of
contract came to my attention." Dissenting in Lochner, justice Holmes observed that
"Nunday laws and usury laws are ancient examples" of interference with liberty to
contract, and cited numerous modern examples. 74 Lochner offered no explanation for its
abandonment of the settled common law meaning of "liberty," which the Ratifiers of the
fourteenth amendment also understood to mean merely freedom of locomotion." In-
stead, the Court resorted to naked fiat: "There is no reasonable ground for interfering
with the .. right of free contract," thus postulating that such a right exists. 76
In truth, the Court was engaged in shoving laissez faire down the throat of the
American people, deciding, as Holmes said, "upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain." 77 Later he explained that underlying such
decisions was the "comfortable classes"' fear of socialism that influenced judicial action,
leading to "a wholesale prohibition of what a tribunal of lawyers does not think about
right," and to the discovery of "new principles ... outside the bodies of [the several
constitutions]."" To borrow from Cardozo, Lochner transformed the word "liberty" in
order "to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion."'y For Brennan, however,
Lochner fell short because it focused on "negative liberty" as "freedom from restraint,"
noting that Cardozo summarized "positive liberty" in terms of equality of bargaining
7" I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs ON THE LAW 'OE ENGLAND 134 (1765-1769), "In the begin-
ning of constitutional government," Cardozo wrote, "the freedom that was uppermost in the minds
of men was freedom of the body." CARDOZO, PARADOXES, supra note 67, at 07. Charles Warren
concluded, "there seems to little question that, under the common law, the word 'liberty' meant
simply 'liberty or person', or, in other words, 'the right to have one's person free from physical
restraint.— Warren, The New 'Liberty' Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV, L. REV. 431, 440
(1926).
71 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
73 Warren, supra note 70, at 441 (emphasis in original).
73 Edward Corwin wrote, "[p]rior to the Civil War American constitutional law and theory
evince a quite surprising unconcern regarding 'liberty'. .. . So Far as the power of the states was
involved, in brief, liberty was the liberty which the ordinary law allowed and nothing more." E.
CORWIN, THE "1 4 WILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 78
(1934).
" 198 U.S. ai 75.
" Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania,
18 AKRON L. REv. 435, 448 (1985). In the debates on the amendment, Senator Henry Wilson of
Massachusetts had urged the Framers to insure that the freedman "can go where he pleases."
AVINS, supra note 6, al 98.
7" 198 U.S. at 57.
77 Id. al 75.
0,W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 184 (1920).
7" B. CARnozo, Ti I E NATURE 01"El IE JUDICIAL PROCESS 80 (1920) [hereinafter CARDozo, NATURE].
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position. 8° Perhaps Cardozo felt constrained to accept "freedom of contract" as existing
law and suggested a way of tempering it. The mistake of the Justices, Brennan considers,
however, was that the 'judges had cut themselves off from other sources of inspiration
that could have enriched their rational debate."'" It escapes him that Lochner was not a
product of "pure reason," but of "passion," that it drew "inspiration" from a bias in
favor of the propertied class of which for many years the Court was the handmaiden. 82
Their "intuition" ran counter to Brennan's.
DEATH PENALTIES
Justice Brennan's penchant for identifying his personal predilections with consti-
tutional dogma is starkly revealed by his treatment of death penalties. Until recent times,
a leading opponent of death penalties, Hugo Bedau, acknowledged, "An unbroken line
of interpreters held that it was the original understanding and intent of the Eighth
Amendment to proscribe as 'cruel and unusual' only modes of execution which com-
pound the simple infliction of death with additional cruelties," for example, "burning at
the stake, crucifixion," 83
 In 1972, the majority of the Court, Justice Brennan participat-
ing, discovered in Furman v. Georgia that the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual
punishments" clause curtailed the state's sovereign power over death penalties. 84 That
clause had been lifted from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. For 100 years thereafter,
a whole catalog of crimes continued to be punished by death. 85 When the eighth amend-
ment added the clause in 1789, the companion fifth amendment contemplated that one
could be deprived of life after a clue process proceeding. 86 The First Congress, which
had drafted the Bill of Rights, enacted the Act of April 30, I 790, 87 which made a number
of offenses punishable by death, thus evidencing the draftsmen's understanding that
death penalties had not been banned. Nothing in the history of the fourteenth amend-
ment indicates an intention to abolish the States' rights to impose death penalties. 88
For Justice Brennan, however, "death stands condemned as fatally offensive to
human dignity."89 The "fundamental premise" of the "cruel and unusual punishments"
clause, he asserts, is "that even the most base criminal remains a human being possessed
"O Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, supra note I, at 960.
5 I Id.
" In the 19th century, Leonard Levy observes, "a property-minded judiciary had run amok,
inventing judicial doctrines to protect corporate interests from public regulation." The Court
"shaped constitutional law so that employers were free to exploit workers in accord with so-called
laws of supply and demand and free competition." Levy, Properly as a Human Right, 5 CONST.
COMMENTARY 169, 177, 178 (1988).
'° H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 35 (1977).
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972)..
" In 1785 Archdeacon William Paley justified "England's 'Bloody Code' of more than 250
capital crimes." McGatitha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 281 (1971).
" Sanford Levinson, an activist, considers that this presents a "devastating problem." Levinson,
Wrong Rai Legal, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 1983, at 248. Stephen Gillers, another activist, wrote this is
"uncontested." Gillers, Boger Redux, 92 YALE L.J. 731, 740 (1983).
" 1 Stat. 117 § 21 Om Cong., 2d Sess.) (1791).
"" Gillers regards it as an "uncontested proposition" that adoption of the fourteenth amendment
"was riot intended to invalidate capital punishment." Gillers, supra note 86, at 740.
m Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 286, 305 (Brennan, J., concurring). Condemning Dred Scott,
William Cullen Bryan asked, are we "to admit that the Constitution was never befbre rightly
understood, even by those who framed it?" A. NEVINS, 1 THE: EMERGE:NC:I.: OF LINCOLN 96 (1950).
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of some potential, at least, for human dignity."" English and early American law, how-
ever, cared not a whit for "human dignity." Blackstone wrote that some punishments
"fix a lasting .stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the hand or
cheek;" other punishments "consist principally in their ignominy . . . such as whipping,
... the pillory, the stocks, and ducking stool."' Lord Camden, who had been Chief'
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, referred in the course of the 1791 debate on
Fox's Libel Act to the punishment that might "be inflicted ... whether it was fine,
imprisonment, loss of ears, whipping or any other disgrace,"" Such punishments were
common in colonial and early American law." A Massachusetts statute of 1791 provided
that highway robbers should be burned on the forehead or hand.'" As late as 1823,
Nathan Dane noted such punishments as "pillory, branding, whipping." 5 Nathaniel
Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter recorded such an incident. Imprisonment is also an affront
to "human dignity." Would Justice Brennan abolish imprisonment for murder?
The Founders did not share Brennan's exalted view of the importance of the
individual vis -a -vis the State. As Gordon Wood wrote, "The sacrifice of individual inter-
ests to the greater good of the whole formed the essence of republicanism and compre-
hended for Americans the idealistic goal of their Revolution." 6 "Ideally, republicanism
obliterated the individual." John Dickinson wrote, "A people is travelling fast to destruc-
tion, when individuals consider their interests as distinct from those of the public." 97 Alpheus
Thomas Mason concluded that "Lijn the Convention and later, states rights — not
indiVidual rights — was the real worry."" "The original Constitution," wrote Zccheriah
Ghafee, "did very little to protect human rights against the States.""
Given this prevailing attitude, it is not surprising that when the Founders came to
spell out individual rights in the Bill of Rights, the list was meager indeed. Four amend-
ments are concerned with criminal proceedings, another with civil suits, the others
safeguard freedom of speech and religion, the right to bear arms and a ban against
quartering soldiers in private homes. The "human rights" fashioned of late by the Court
are judicial fabrications without constitutional warrant.'" Brennan's invocation of "hu-
Man dignity" is of this order. He acknowledges that his
" THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note I, at 24.
8E 4 WILLIAM BLACKsToNE, COMMENTARIES ON "ME. LAW OF ENGLAND 377 (1765-1769) (emphasis
in original).
Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 136 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
85 A. EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS IN BYGONE DAYS 3, 72, 139, 147, 318 (1896).
94 R. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTY 237 (1959).
95 2 Dane Ab. 569, 570, Toted in Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428 (1885).
"" Wool), supra note 49, at 53; see also id. at 57-58.
87 Id. at 61 n.30 (emphasis in original).
98 A. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 75 (1964).
" Z. CHAFFY., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONsTITUTION OF 1787 90 (1968). Justice Brennan
notes that "Mlle original document before addition of any of the amendments, does not speak
primarily of the rights of man, but of the abilities or disabilities of government." THE GREAT
DEBATE, supra note 1, at 18.
' 110 In the recent "sodomy" case, Bowers v. Hardwick, justice White observed that despite the
procedural implications of the due process clause language, the Court has read substantive restric-
tions into due process and recognized "rights that have little or no textual support in the consti-
tutional language." 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986). The Court refused "to discover new fundamental
rights embedded in the Due Process Clause" explaining that "Nile Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
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is an interpretation to which a majority of my fellow Justices [7] — not to
mention, it would seem, a majority of my fellow countrymen — does not
subscribe .... On this issue, the death penalty, I hope to embody a com-
munity striving for human dignity for all, although perhaps not arrived)"
And Brennan is not content merely to express a pious hope but, departing from the
usual practice, dissents in case after case.'m Not long since, the New York Times noted
that "Opponents of the death penalty, acknowledging the overwhelming public, political
and legal support for the death penalty, are ... saying that they expect it to be a long
time before public attitudes can be changed."'°' Manifestly, the people do not share
Brennan's conception of what "human dignity" requires, so that, were he in the majority,
he would embody his own predilection in the Constitution.'" The philosopher Sidney
Hook decried those "who know what the basic needs ... should be, who know not only
what these needs are but what they require better than those who have them or should
have them." 1 °5
APPEALS TO CARDOZO
Justice Brennan's panegyrist, Robert McKay, congratulates him for "building upon
[Cardozo's] important work;"'" and in delivering the Cardozo lecture before the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York, Brennan repeatedly invoked Cardozo's
authority for his own pronouncements. But Brennan's view of the judicial role is poles
removed from that of Cardozo.
Preliminarily, it is to be emphasized that Cardozo wrote against the background of
the common law, studding his writings with examples therefrom. From earliest times,
the making of the law of torts, contracts and the like had been confided to judges by
Parliament. The Statute of Westminster (1285), for instance, authorized the issuance of
writs in cases "of like nature," giving rise to the vast jurisdiction of Action on the Case.' °7
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id. at 2846. "Otherwise," he stated,
"the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express
constitutional authority." Id. For citations to activists who agree that there is no constitutional warrant
for the "human rights" created by the modern Court, see Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justifi-
cation for Judicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 465, 466 (1983).
1 ° 1
 THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 1, at 24. Brennan confirms John Hart Ely's demonstration
that at the end of every voyage of "discovery," what the judge is "really . . 'discovering' ... are his
own values." Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term: Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92
HARV. L. REV. 5, 16 (1978). It gives one pause to be reminded by Ely that "Lenin used to claim this
god-like gift of divination of the people's 'real' interests." Id. at 51 n.198.
102 "Mlle refusal by some judges to quit dissenting, long after they have failed to have their
way on an issue, contributes to an impression that they write on a clean slate," i.e., voicing their
own predilections. Lewis, supra note 51, at 23-24.
1 °3
 N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1985, at A-13. "Capital Punishment is very popular all over the
country." Sherill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983 (Magazine), at 80.
1 " Compare supra note 34 and accompanying text.
LOS S. HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 28 (1980) (emphasis in original). Sir (now Lord)
Noel Annan, Vice Chancellor of the University of London, rejected the theory that governments
"can identify what people would really want were they enlightened," That would justify the State
"in ignoring what ordinary people say they desire or detest." Introduction to I. BERLIN, PERSONAL
IMPRESSIONS xvii (1980).
1° Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, supra note 1, at 975.
107 13 Edw. I ch. 24 (1285).
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The origin of such rules, Cardozo observed, "was the creation of the courts themselves,
could be 'abrogated' by them, 108 and could be modified or set aside by Parliament." Very
different is the judicial role under a Constitution designed, as Chief Justice Marshall
declared, to limn power, under which the Court claims finality for its judgments.m In
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall held that Congress could not alter the Con-
stitution, even with the object of enlarging the Court's "original" jurisdiction. And in his
Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall wrote that the judicial jurisdiction does not
extend to the "assertion of a right to change" the Constitution."" That right was reserved
to the people themselves by the Article V process of amendment.'" To alter the meaning
due process or "cruel and unusual punishments" had for the Founders is to rewrite the
Constitution, a fact that no euphemism can disguise. Brennan's highly regarded col-
league, Justice Harlan, stated: "When the Court disregards the express intent and
understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which
the amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure
which it is its highest duty to protect."TM 2 These considerations are enhanced when the
issue is how far the alleged generalities of the fourteenth amendment curtail the resi-
duary state control of internal matters guaranteed by the tenth.
For Cardozo a statute was binding: "[i]n particular [a judge] may not substitute his
own reading for one established by the legislature, acting within constitutional limitations,
through the pronouncements of a statute."'" Judges have no right "to ignore the
mandate of a statute, and render judgment in despite of it."J 14 Still less may they act in
despite of a constitutional mandate, the determination of the sovereign people, for
example, to exclude suffrage from the fourteenth amendment. Cardozo regards stare
decisis as "at least the everyday working rule of our law,"'" "the rule and not the
exception." 1 I 6 Although no slave to precedent, he nonetheless wrote that "What has once
been settled by a precedent will not be unsettled overnight."" 7 Compare 180 years of
unchallenged death penalties. Again and again Cardozo emphasized that "the process
by which judges work is one of erosion rather than avulsion. Here a little and there a
little."" The "doctrine of traditional development will forbid far-reaching change,
change revolutionary in the suddenness of its onset and the extent of its upheaval."'"
It suffices to mention the one man-one vote and death penalty decisions to demonstrate
how far removed Brennan is from Cardozo's thinking.
Cardozo's conception of the judicial role, even within the generous confines of the
common law, was vastly more modest than that of Justice Brennan: "Judges are not
1 " B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF 'rHE LAW 1'36-37 (1924) [hereinafter CARDOZO, GROWTH].
' 1 ' 9 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U,S. I (1958).
LID Marshall, supra note l3, at 209.
"iThe Constitution was not to be "amended by judicial decision without action by the desig-
nated organs in the mode by which alone amendments can be made." McPherson v. Blacker, 140
U.S. 1, 36 (1892).
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, j., dissenting).
115 CARDOZO, PARADOXES, supra note 67, at 55.
" 4 CARDOZO, NATURE, supra note 79, at 129.
115 Id. at 20; see also id. at 112; CARDOZO, GROWTH, supra note 108, at 62.
116 CARDOZ0, NATURE, supra note 79, at 149.
1 " CARD0z0, PARADOXES, supra note 67, at 29.
Id. at 42, 56.
"9 1d. at 121.
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commissioned to make or unmake rules at pleasure in accordance with changing views
of, expediehcys
 or wisdom."'" Recognizing that there were gaps in the common law that
called for "interstitial" legislation, Cardozo yet believed that the judge "is not to innovate
at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness." 121 Nevertheless, Brennan quotes this passage,' 22
 oblivious that
he is doing precisely what Cardozo condemns by seeking to "embody [a hoped for
future] community striving for human dignity for all," while the people cling to death
penalties. In Cardozo's view, "the power of innovation of any judge" is insignificant. L 23
"Narrow at best," he wrote, "is any freedom that is allotted to us. "124 Over-emphasis on
this small enclave obscures the larger problem presented by Brennan's indisputable
judicial revision of the Constitution, e.g., death penalties and the one man-one vote,
often in despite of the people's will.
Repeatedly Cardozo stressed that the criterion is not "what I believe to be right;"' 29
it is not for the judge "to impose upon the community as a rule of life his own idiosyn-
cracies of conduct or belief," 126 Rather, "he would be under a duty to conform to accepted
standards of the community, the mores of the times."' 22 Above all, Cardozo rejected a
"jurisprudence of mere sentiment or feeling." 128
 Brennan's treatment of due process
and of death penalties exemplifies Cardozo's warning that reasoning is "vitiated ... by
starting with a prepossession and finding arguments to sustain it,"' 29 the process James
Harvey Robinson termed "wishful thinking."'" Brennan's stress on 'justice" takes small
21) CARDozo, NATURE, supra note 79, at 68. Chief justice Marshall cautioned that "[t]he peculiar
circumstances of the moment may reader a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more
or less constitutional." MARSHALL, supra note 13, at 190-91. Justice Story likewise stated, "the wisdom
or expediency of a measure is no test of its constitutionality." Story, supra note 46, at § 970. Justice
Holmes stated, "[t]he criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the
public good." Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923) (Holmes, j., dissenting). And
justice Black, who shared many of Brennan's social goals, derided "rhapsodical strains, about the
duty of the Court to keep the Constitution in tulle with the times." Needed change was to be met
by the amendment process of article V. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 429, 522 (Black, J.,
dissenting). In McCray v. United States, justice Edward White said, "no instance is afforded from the
foundation of the government where an act, which was within a power conferred, was declared to
he repugnant to the Constitution, because it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular
exertion of constitutional power was either unwise or Unjust." 195 U.S. 27, 54 (1904). Holmes and
Black could appeal to the authority of the Court itself.
121 CARDOZO, NATURE, supra note 79, at 141. For the Framers, "judicial innovation itself was
regarded as an impermissible exercise of will." Horwitz, supra note 58, at 298. Chief justice Rehn-
quist rephrased the idea; ItJhe Justices of the Supreme Court were not appointed to roam at large
in the realm of public policy, and strike down laws that offend their own ideas of what laws are
desirable." W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT is 314 (1988).
122 See Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law, supra note 1, at 961.
123 CARDOZO, NATURE, supra note 79, at 136.
124
 Cattuozo, GROWTH, supra note 108, at 61.
125
 CARDOZO, NATURE, supra note 79, at 89.
12 " Id. at 108. Brennan professes to share this view; see supra text accompanying note 34.
127
 CARDOZO, NATURE, Supra note 79, at IN.
128 Id. at 106. "Lawyers who are unwilling to study the law as it is, may discover, as they think,
that study is unnecessary; sentiment or benevolence or some vague notion of social welfare becomes
the only equipment needed .... Nothing can take the place of rigorous and accurate and profound
study of the law as already developed by the wisdom of the past." CARDOZO, GROWTH, supra note
108, at 59-60.
126
 CARDOZO, PARADOXES, supra note 67, at 126.
m°114. ROBINSON, MIND IN TitE MAIHNG (1921).
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account' 31
 of Cardozo's struggle to define the term, and his conclusion that "when all is
said and done," it "remains to some extent ... the synonym of an aspiration, a mood of
exaltation, a yearning for what is line or high."in That is hardly sufficient warrant for
curbing a state's right to control administration of its own internal affairs.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing, to my mind, amply demonstrates that Justice Brennan brings his
own agenda to the Constitution and is committed to a course that cannot be reconciled
with the Constitution or with long established methods of construction. He exemplifies
what Fred Rodell of Yale found so praiseworthy in Chief Justice Warren, who "brush[ed]
of pedantic impedimenta to the results he felt were right," was not a "look-it-up-in-the-
library" intellectual, and was "almost unique" in his "off-hand dismissal of legal and
historical research."'" In place of Warren's litmus test "Is it fair?"'m Brennan substitutes
"Does it offend human dignity?" To give Brennan his due, he now essays to proffer
some quasi-historical-analytical justification for his interpretive approach. Whether he
has succeeded the reader must decide.
"I It is said that when justice Holmes left the Massachusetts bench for the Supreme Court "he
was admonished to do justice. He responded thoughtfully that his job was merely to enforce the
law." W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT 116 (1961).
Writing of self-conscious judicial activism, Dean Acheson said that a judge "may conscientiously be
seeking to administer justice, but it is personal justice — the justice of Louis 1X or Harun-al-Rashid
— not that described on the lintel of the the Supreme Court Building, 'Equal justice Under Law.'"
D, ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 69 (1965). Latterly Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "the Court
has no generalized mandate to 'do justice. — REHNQUIST, supra note 121, at 175.
"2 CARDOZO, GROWTH, 5141 1a note 108, at 87.
	 .
"3 Rodell, It is the Warren Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar, 13, 1966 (Magazine), at 30 in L. LEVY ED.,
THE SUPREMF. COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 137-39, 142 (1972); lb both Brati n v, Board af'Educla, t•ion
(desegregation) and Reynolds v. Sims (reapportionment), Rodell iake`s jileasur'e in
ren was quite unworried that legislative history, dug from a liki'ary, Might nut
	 tffi
Id. at 94.
13"' Referring to the "hard core," "liberal" Wiiig tiff th6	 FiatikfUrfer wrote to Judge
• Learned Hand that "Nheir commit cien'othihatoF is a "selt=righteous
	 H.N. HIRSCH,
THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 181 (1981).
At the conclusion of his Paniiikes of Leicit	 Cardozo wrote, "I may seem to quote
overmuch. My excuse is the deslFe to Make manifest the truth that bark of what I write is the
sanction of something strOilger tiitht My own unaided thought .. , " CARDOZO, PARADOXES, supra
note 67, at 313. How muck iiiiifc May a lesser person be indulged for following his example.
